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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 08-1773

SHAWN HOSEA VANLIER,
Appellant
v.
Warden, THOMAS CARROLL;
ATTORNEY GENERAL JANE BRADY

On Appeal From the United States
District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-05-cv-00763)
District Judge: Hon. Gregory M. Sleet

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 28, 2010
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 17, 2010)

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal of the District Court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus to Shawn
Hosea VanLier raises the following two issues: (1) whether VanLier’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to file a motion to dismiss the indictment or failing to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus based upon the denial of VanLier’s speedy trial rights. We will affirm.
I.
Officers of the Wilmington Police Department arrested VanLier on September 9,
1998, after a sexual assault victim identified him as her attacker in a police photo array.
Just over a month later, on October 13, 1998, a grand jury in New Castle County returned
a four-count indictment, charging VanLier with attempted rape in the first degree,
kidnapping in the first degree, reckless endangering in the second degree, and assault in
the third degree.
Meanwhile, shortly after VanLier’s arrest, the police sent hair samples and other
evidence from the scene of the attack to an FBI forensic lab for testing. An initial lab
report inculpating VanLier was forwarded to the State in September 1999. However, on
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November 15, 1999, the State received a final mitochondrial DNA report which excluded
VanLier as the source of any of the hair samples.
The Delaware Superior Court considered discovery closed as of March 6, 2000,
and on April 6, 2000, the court set a trial date of August 22, 2000. The defense intended
to introduce the exculpatory DNA evidence at trial, but on June 27, 2000, the State filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence of the mitochondrial DNA examination, on grounds
that “[m]itochondrial DNA analysis is a relatively new form of DNA sequencing and has
never before been deemed admissible by Delaware courts.” App. at 105. On July 25,
2000, the parties filed a joint request for a continuance, on grounds that there was not
enough time before the August 22, 2000 trial date in which to prepare for and hold a
Daubert hearing on the State’s motion in limine, and that “[d]efense counsel will be in a
capital murder trial [that] may extend into the week of August 21, 2000.” Id. at 111-12.
The court granted the continuance request and rescheduled the trial for March 2001.
Eventually, the parties entered into a stipulation that was read to the jury stating that
“[t]he evidence in this case was collected and preserved and sent to the FBI laboratory.
There is no forensic evidence that ties the defendant to the crime.” Id. at 177.
On March 14, 2001, approximately two and one-half years from the time VanLier
was arrested, trial commenced in the Delaware Superior Court. During this time between
the arrest and trial, defense counsel did not file a motion to dismiss the indictment on
speedy trial grounds, despite the fact that VanLier attempted to file two such motions pro
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se. On March 16, 2001, the jury found VanLier guilty of all charges. The Superior Court
sentenced VanLier to a term of incarceration of twenty-seven years to be followed by
probation for the balance of his life.
VanLier appealed, and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed his conviction
and sentence. VanLier then filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, and the
Superior Court denied the motion in part, dismissing all of the claims except that of
ineffective assistance of counsel. On the ineffective assistance claim, the Superior Court
ordered an expansion of the record. Regarding VanLier’s speedy trial claim, the Superior
Court concluded that the Delaware Supreme Court considered and rejected the claim on
direct appeal, and so the claim was barred under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i)(4). State v. VanLier, 2004 WL 692633, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2004).
VanLier filed an interlocutory appeal of this order of the Superior Court, and the
Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Following further
submissions by VanLier’s trial counsel, the Superior Court denied VanLier’s claim for
post-conviction relief on ineffective assistance grounds. VanLier once again appealed,
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying postconviction relief.
VanLier then instituted this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, asserting numerous claims for relief. The District
Court denied relief and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. VanLier filed a
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notice of appeal and request for certificate of appealability, and we granted the certificate
as to three issues: “(1) whether [VanLier’s] constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss
the indictment or a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of [VanLier’s]
constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (3) whether [VanLier’s] ineffective assistance of
counsel claims were properly presented to the state courts and, accordingly, are
exhausted.”
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over VanLier’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction to review the District
Court’s denial of the writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.
When reviewing a district court decision concerning a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “[w]e apply the same standards as the District
Court, as mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(‘AEDPA’).” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2005).
Under AEDPA, habeas relief on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a
judgment of a state court cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in state court proceedings unless the decision is contrary to, or involves an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or is based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state
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court proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA thus limits a federal court’s authority to
grant habeas relief when a state court has previously considered and rejected the federal
claims on the merits.
“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause [of § 2254(d)], a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). In determining whether the state court unreasonably
applied Supreme Court precedent, the question is whether the state court’s application of
federal law was objectively unreasonable, not whether the application was, in the
judgment of the federal habeas court, erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 282.
III.
We turn first to VanLier’s argument that his constitutional right to a speedy trial
was violated during the two and one-half years between the time he was arrested and the
start of his trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants “the right to a
speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), identified the factors “courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant has been deprived of [this] right . . . [l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at
530.
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The first factor, “[t]he length of the delay[,] is to some extent a triggering
mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Id. The Supreme
Court has suggested that delays of one year or more trigger an analysis of the remaining
Barker factors. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (noting that
“the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’
at least as it approaches one year,” and this “marks the point at which courts deem the
delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry”).
Regarding the third Barker factor, “[p]rejudice . . . should be assessed in the light
of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect . . . (i)
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407
U.S. at 532. “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court on direct appeal properly identified Barker and its
enumeration of the above-mentioned factors as the governing precedent regarding
VanLier’s speedy trial claim. VanLier v. State, No. 287, 2001, 2002 WL 31883016, at *2
(Del. Dec. 27, 2002). The question for us, then, given the AEDPA standard of review, is
whether the Court unreasonably applied Barker and its factors in denying VanLier’s
claim.
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The Delaware Supreme Court noted Barker’s statement that “none of the four
factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the
right of speedy trial.’” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). Indeed, the Barker Court
held that the four factors are “related . . . and must be considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities;
courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Barker, 407 U.S.
at 533. Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded “that a discussion of all
four factors is unnecessary because the record clearly shows that VanLier suffered no
prejudice to his defense as a result of the delay.” VanLier, 2002 WL 31883016, at *2. In
other words, the Court short-circuited the Barker analysis by focusing only on the fourth
factor, prejudice to the defendant, and it did so by focusing only on the third type of
prejudice noted by the Barker Court, impairment of a defense.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies in the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis, we
agree with and hereby adopt the District Court’s comprehensive and careful analysis of
the remaining Barker factors, and its conclusion that while “the 10 month delay attributed
to the difficulties in obtaining the DNA results should be weighed slightly against the
State . . . as a whole, the State pursued VanLier’s case with reasonable diligence,” and
“[b]alancing that factor with VanLier’s failure to demonstrate prejudice . . . the Delaware
Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Barker.” VanLier v. Carroll, 535 F. Supp. 2d
467, 483 (D. Del. 2008).
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For the reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that the result reached by
the Delaware Supreme Court was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, and we will affirm.
IV.
Regarding VanLier’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a
motion to dismiss the indictment or failing to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
based on the speedy trial issue, where there is no merit to an issue, counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise that issue. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“Because we see no merit to [petitioner’s] underlying claim of error, we also
hold that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.”). We have adopted the
District Court’s analysis of and conclusion concerning the Barker factors, and thus
VanLier’s speedy trial rights were not violated. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective
for failing to raise the speedy trial issue either by a motion to dismiss or by a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.1
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
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Regarding the final issue on which we granted the certificate of appealability,
“whether [VanLier’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claims were properly presented to
the state courts and, accordingly, are exhausted,” given that counsel was not ineffective
for failing to raise these issues, it matters not whether the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were properly presented to the state courts. Thus, we need not address this issue
further.
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